Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical

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Liu, Fangfei; Yarom, Yuval; Ge, Qian; Heiser, Gernot; Lee, Ruby B

Liu, Fangfei; Yarom, Yuval; Ge, Qian; Heiser, Gernot; Lee, Ruby B


2015-05-18


Conference Material


IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P)


San Jose, CA, US


605-622


We present an effective implementation of the Prime+Probe side-channel attack against the last-level cache. We measure the capacity of the covert channel the attack creates and demonstrate a cross-core, cross-VM attack on multiple versions of GnuPG. Our technique achieves a high attack resolution without relying on weaknesses in the OS or hypervisor or on sharing memory between attacker and victim.


best, security, timing channels, leakage, clouds


http://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2015/


nicta:8432


Liu, Fangfei; Yarom, Yuval; Ge, Qian; Heiser, Gernot; Lee, Ruby B. Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P); San Jose, CA, US. 2015-05-18. 605-622.



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